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Imre Lakatos' concept that scientific research operates within theoretical frameworks that dictate what paths of research should be taken.

The idea that what we observe is influenced by the theories and concepts that we bring to the process of observation.

Suggests that for any given set of data, there may be multiple explanations or theories. Hence, the data alone cannot determine which theory is correct.

A philosophical theory that suggests that science should only deal with what can be observed and measured. Claims that metaphysical statements are not meaningful.

Proposed by Bas van Fraassen, this view holds that scientific theories do not need to be true but only empirically adequate; they need to correctly describe observable phenomena, not necessarily unobservable entities.

The belief that the world described by science is real irrespective of how it may be interpreted. Realism holds that entities discussed in scientific theory exist independently of the mind.

Thomas Kuhn's idea that science progresses through a series of paradigm shifts rather than through a linear accumulation of knowledge.

A view that theories are merely tools for predicting observations and should not be taken as true descriptions of reality.

A philosophy where the criterion of the truth is not sensory but intellectual and deductive, claiming that reason alone can produce knowledge.

Proposed by Karl Popper, it insists that for a theory to be considered scientific, it must be able to be tested and falsified.

Argues that scientific knowledge is constructed by scientists and not determined by the inherent nature of reality. Emphasizes the role of social factors in the development of scientific theories.

A stance in the philosophy of science that looks to develop norms from the study of actual scientific practice, rather than from abstractions or a priori principles.

An American tradition that assesses the truth of meaning of theories in terms of the success of their practical application.

An argument against scientific realism that infers, from the historical failure of past scientific theories, the likely failure of current scientific theories.

A form of realism that asserts the existence of entities involved in theories, but remains agnostic about the truth of the theories themselves.

Distinction made between the processes involved in the creation of scientific theories (context of discovery) and the methods used to justify them (context of justification).

Argues that we may not know the nature of entities posited by scientific theories, but we can know the structure or relations that characterize these entities.

A theory that states that knowledge comes primarily from sensory experience. Empiricists emphasize the role of empirical evidence in the formation of ideas, rather than innate ideas or traditions.

This theory, notably presented by Duhem and Quine, suggests that scientific theories cannot be tested in isolation, but only as part of a whole group of assumptions.