Explore tens of thousands of sets crafted by our community.
Mechanism Design
7
Flashcards
0/7
Revelation Principle
The principle stating any outcome achievable by a mechanism can also be achieved by a mechanism in which it is a dominant strategy for participants to truthfully reveal their information.
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanism
A type of auction where bidders submit their bids without knowing the bids of other people, and the highest bidder wins, but the price paid is the second-highest bid.
Incentive Compatibility
A condition where each participant's best interest, according to their own preferences, is to perform in a way that the mechanism intended, usually by conveying truthful information.
Pareto Efficiency in Mechanism Design
A situation where it is impossible to reallocate resources to make at least one individual better off without making at least one other individual worse off, in the context of a given mechanism.
Individual Rationality
A condition in mechanism design ensuring that all participants are at least as well off by participating in the mechanism as they would be if they did not participate.
Budget Balance
A property of a mechanism where the total payments collected from the participants are equal to the total payments or resources redistributed to them.
Mechanism Design without Monetary Transfers
The study of mechanism design in cases where money cannot be used as a transferable utility, often relying on alternative methods of incentives or allocations.
© Hypatia.Tech. 2024 All rights reserved.