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The principle stating any outcome achievable by a mechanism can also be achieved by a mechanism in which it is a dominant strategy for participants to truthfully reveal their information.

The study of mechanism design in cases where money cannot be used as a transferable utility, often relying on alternative methods of incentives or allocations.

A type of auction where bidders submit their bids without knowing the bids of other people, and the highest bidder wins, but the price paid is the second-highest bid.

A situation where it is impossible to reallocate resources to make at least one individual better off without making at least one other individual worse off, in the context of a given mechanism.

A property of a mechanism where the total payments collected from the participants are equal to the total payments or resources redistributed to them.

A condition in mechanism design ensuring that all participants are at least as well off by participating in the mechanism as they would be if they did not participate.