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A thought experiment used to explore the nature of personal identity. If a person is teletransported, creating a replica with their memories and personality, are they the same person? Problem: It questions the necessity of bodily continuity for personal identity.

A principle stating if two things are identical, then they have all the same properties. Problem: If object A is object B, they must share all properties, raising questions about the properties of objects over time.

A view that mental states are identical to brain states. It suggests that for every type of mental state, there is a corresponding brain state. Example: The pain you feel when touching something hot is identical to brain activity in the sensory cortex.

The concept that a single mental state can be realized by many different physical states. Problem: This poses a challenge to type identity theory by showing that mental states are not necessarily identical to specific brain states.

A philosophical perspective, often associated with Buddhism, that denies the existence of a permanent, unchanging self. Example: The belief that 'self' is an illusion and is constantly changing.

Parfit argues that existence over time is not about identity but about psychological connectedness and/or continuity. Example: Survival without Identity - where one's future self is simply very connected to one's current self.

The view that personal identity is maintained through the continuity of the physical body. Problem: Thought experiments like brain swaps highlight issues with this theory.

A theory that personal identity through time is maintained by psychological links like memory, personality, or intention. Problem: Cases of amnesia or personality change challenge the theory.

The claim that individual instances of mental events are identical with individual physical events in the brain, but not with types of physical events. Problem: The plasticity of brain processes challenges this theory.

Refers to two entities sharing the same qualities or properties. Example: Two cars from the same model and color have qualitative identity.

A thought experiment that raises questions about identity. If all parts of a ship are replaced, is it still the same ship? Problem: It challenges the notion of numerical identity when considering objects over time.

The standpoint in the philosophy of mind that mental states can be directly correlated with types of neurological states. Example: A specific sensation of pain correlates with a specific type of brain activity.

The criterion suggesting that a person's identity is based on their memories. Problem: False or implanted memories pose a philosophical problem to this criterion.

A criterion for personal identity that considers the continuity or survival of the brain as central to the existence of the same person over time. Problem: It faces challenges from thought experiments involving brain transplants or duplicates.

Locke held that personal identity is a matter of psychological continuity. He emphasized memory as a key factor. Problem: Locke's theory struggles with cases where memory is not reliable or is manipulated.

A concept that personal identity is constituted by the stories we tell about ourselves, integrating our past, present, and anticipated future into a coherent narrative. Example: A person's autobiography shaping their identity.

The problem of understanding how a person persists and remains the same over time, despite physical or psychological changes. Example: Considering whether you remain the 'same' person throughout your life.

The question asks what determines that a being at one time is the same being at another time. Example: Considering what makes you the same person you were as a child.

Refers to the sameness of one object; being one and the same. Example: Clark Kent and Superman are numerically identical despite different appearances.