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Truths that could have been otherwise; they are true in some possible worlds but not others. Kripke argued that certain truths thought to be necessary were actually contingent.

Statements that assert the identity of two references, such as 'Hesperus is Phosphorus'. Kripke discusses how such statements can be both necessary and known a posteriori.

Properties an object can have without being essential to its identity. Kripke argues that an object could lose these properties without ceasing to exist or be the object it is.

The principle that if two expressions refer to the same object, they should be interchangeable in all contexts without changing the truth value. Kripke discusses how this principle doesn't always hold in intensional (e.g., belief) contexts.

Terms that refer to the same object in every possible world where that object exists. Kripke introduced this concept to explain how names refer to objects across different possible worlds, maintaining their reference.

A theory of meaning which holds that there is no intermediate sense or description mediating the relationship between a name and its referent. Kripke contributed to this view by arguing that names directly refer to objects without the need for a descriptive content.

A theory proposing that a name's reference is fixed through an initial 'baptism' and then passed down through a causal-historical chain of communication. Kripke's theory challenges descriptivist theories of naming.

Kripke's concept explaining how the reference of a term to an object is initially determined, often through a 'baptism' or initial designation, and subsequently transmitted via a causal-historical chain.

A theory suggesting that a name is essentially a collection of descriptions or properties by which an individual is recognized. Kripke criticized this view, arguing that names actually function as rigid designators.

The initial act that assigns a name to an object, which then becomes the source of the name's reference through a causal chain of communication. This event sets up the 'rigid' reference for terms in Kripke's causal theory of names.

A theoretical framework for discussing how things could have been different. Kripke uses possible worlds to explain the concepts of necessity and contingency.

An argument that uses modal logic to show that some properties are essential to objects, while others are accidental. Kripke's use of the modal argument challenges traditional theories that do not differentiate between essential and accidental properties.

A descriptive theory of naming that suggests a name refers to an object by virtue of a 'cluster' of descriptions associated with the name. Kripke criticized this theory for failing to account for how names actually function in linguistic practice.

Knowledge that can be known independently of any particular experience. Kripke distinguishes between a priori knowledge and necessary truths, showing that some a priori truths could be contingent.

Knowledge that depends on empirical evidence or experience. Kripke argued that there could be truths that are known a posteriori but are necessarily true.

Truths that could not have been otherwise in any possible world. Kripke used this concept to challenge the traditional Kantian distinction between a priori necessity and a posteriori contingency.

A problem highlighted by Kripke regarding the interchangeability of names in belief contexts and the resultant implications for the meaning of names and the content of beliefs.

Properties an object must have to be the entity that it is. Kripke introduced the idea that some properties are essential across all possible worlds, unlike accidental properties.

Kripke's claim that a particular individual could not have originated from a different sperm and egg, nor could it have come into existence at a different time or place from that which it actually did.