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Naturalized epistemology, proposed by W.V.O. Quine, is the idea that epistemology should be grounded in the natural sciences and that the study of knowledge should proceed in a way that is continuous with science.

Confirmation theory deals with the question of how scientific theories are supported or confirmed by evidence. It addresses how we should rationally assess the degree of support that evidence confers on a hypothesis.

A theory is empirically adequate if it correctly predicts observable phenomena. Philosophers like van Fraassen argue that empirical adequacy is a sufficient aim of science, as opposed to truth, which may not be attainable.

Pessimistic induction is the argument that since past scientific theories have often been proven wrong, current scientific theories are likely to be proven wrong as well. This challenges scientific realism by suggesting that reliability of current theories may be overestimated.

Scientific explanation involves elucidating why events occur using the laws of nature and initial conditions. It often entails providing a causal narrative and answering 'why' questions in a systematic and testable way.

In contrast to empiricism, rationalism asserts that reason and innate knowledge are primary in the acquisition of knowledge. It argues that there are significant ways in which our concepts and knowledge are gained independently of sense experience.

Constructive empiricism, as espoused by Bas van Fraassen, holds that the goal of science is to develop theories that are empirically adequate without committing to their literal truth, focusing instead on observable phenomena.

The scientific method is a systematic approach to research and inquiry that seeks to develop new knowledge through empirical evidence. It involves hypothesis formulation, experimentation, observation, and refinement of theories.

This debate in the philosophy of science concerns the extent to which the world is independently of our perceptions or theories. Realists maintain that theories aim to truthfully describe reality, while anti-realists focus on theories' utility or empirical adequacy.

Proposed by Karl Popper, falsifiability is the capacity for a statement to be proven false and is considered a hallmark of scientific theories. This concept is significant because it distinguishes scientific claims from non-scientific ones.

Introduced by Thomas Kuhn in his book 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions', a paradigm shift is a change in the basic concepts and experimental practices of a scientific discipline. It's important for understanding scientific progress and revolutions.

This concept suggests that what we observe is influenced by the theoretical beliefs that we hold, as argued by philosophers like Thomas Kuhn and Norwood Russell Hanson. It challenges the notion of objective observation in science.

Instrumentalism is the view that theories are merely instruments for predicting and explaining phenomena. It suggests that the theoretical terms of science do not necessarily reflect the true nature of reality but are useful constructs.

Imre Lakatos' concept of a scientific research programme stresses the importance of a series of theories connected by a shared 'hard core' of assumptions and a 'protective belt' of auxiliary hypotheses that can be modified in response to empirical data.

The concept of incommensurability, introduced by Kuhn and Feyerabend, suggests that scientific theories from different paradigms cannot be directly compared because they involve different languages and standards of validation.

Causal inference in philosophy of science involves deducing the consequences of causal relations and understanding how evidence can indicate such relations. It is central to scientific explanations and predictions.

Scientific realism is the view that the universe described by science is real regardless of how it may be interpreted. It holds that scientific theories explain phenomena in terms of unobservable entities and that these entities exist independently of our conceptions of them.

Underdetermination is the idea that evidence alone cannot determine the choice between competing theories. Multiple theories may be equally consistent with the data, raising questions about the relationship between theory and evidence.

The problem of induction, famously discussed by David Hume, is the philosophical question of whether inductive reasoning leads to knowledge understood in the classic philosophical sense since it is not necessarily justified by experience.

Empiricism is the theory that all knowledge is derived from sense-experience. It emphasizes the role of empirical evidence in the formation of ideas, rather than innate ideas or traditions.

The Deductive-Nomological model, formulated by Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, is a formal view of scientific explanation. It states that a phenomenon is explained by deducing it from general laws in conjunction with initial conditions.

Induction is the inference of general principles from specific observations. Philosophers of science debate the justification of induction since it makes broader generalizations beyond the observed cases, which may lead to the 'problem of induction'.

The semantic view is an approach to understanding scientific theories focusing on models and their interpretation rather than syntactic structures. It emphasizes how theories are used to construct models that can be applied to natural systems.

This concept addresses the ways that causal relationships are often not deterministic but probabilistic, meaning that a cause increases the likelihood of an effect without necessarily guaranteeing it.