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The view that theories are instruments for predicting phenomena, not necessarily true or false but useful or not. Often contrasted with realism.

The capacity for a theory to be disproven by empirical evidence. It is central in distinguishing science from non-science and was popularized by Karl Popper.

The idea that what we observe is influenced by the theories and beliefs we hold, implying that observations are never neutral.

A method of reasoning from specific observed instances to general principles; the basis for much of scientific reasoning, though it faces the 'problem of induction'.

The principle that among competing hypotheses, the one with the fewest assumptions should be selected. Also known as the principle of parsimony.

A distinction in the philosophy of science between the process of generating scientific theories (discovery) and the process of validating and analyzing them (justification).

A model for understanding scientific explanation that requires a logical deduction of a statement describing the phenomenon to be explained from a set of premises. It was advocated by Carl Hempel.

The view that the entities described by science, while perhaps unobservable, are real and that scientific theories are true or approximately true representations of the world.

When anomalies or inconsistencies within the dominant paradigm lead to a significant change in the scientific framework, as described by Thomas Kuhn.

The idea that available evidence can often be used to support multiple, sometimes incompatible, scientific theories.

The challenge of distinguishing between science and non-science, a central problem in philosophy of science, associated with the concept of falsifiability.

The theory that knowledge is primarily derived from experience and observation, emphasizing the role of empirical evidence in the formation of ideas.

A series of theories or models that share common assumptions and are structured according to a strategic plan for research, as proposed by Imre Lakatos.

An argument against scientific realism suggesting that because many scientific theories have proven false despite prior success, current successful theories may also be false.