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All facts are ultimately physical facts. Proponents include Jaegwon Kim.

The fundamental nature of reality is neither mental nor physical, but a neutral substance. Proponents include Baruch Spinoza and Ernst Mach.

The mind is a non-reducible aspect of the physical; this includes the emergence theory. Proponent is John Searle.

Commonsense psychological concepts are illusory and should be replaced by neuroscientific terms. Proponents include Paul and Patricia Churchland.

Perceptions or consciousness directly grasp the external world without any intermediate representation. Proponents include G.E. Moore and John McDowell.

All matter has a mental aspect or consciousness. Proponents include Galen Strawson.

Belief in the existence of both mental and physical properties. Proponents include René Descartes.

Mental states are defined by what they do rather than by what they are made of. Proponents include Hilary Putnam.

We perceive the external world indirectly through internal representations. Proponents include John Locke.

The hallmark of the mental is 'aboutness' or 'directedness' towards an object. Proponent is Franz Brentano.

Mental states are identical to physical brain states. Proponents include J.J.C. Smart and U.T. Place.

Mental states are just descriptions of behavior. Proponents include B.F. Skinner.

Physical objects are reducible to sensory phenomena. Proponent is George Berkeley.

Mental states are representational states. Proponent is Fred Dretske.

Physical entities have both physical and mental properties. Proponent is David Chalmers.

Basic physical entities possess proto-mental properties. Proponent is William James.

Mental phenomena are the byproducts of physical processes in the brain with no causal effects. Proponent is Thomas Huxley.