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Mental phenomena are the byproducts of physical processes in the brain with no causal effects. Proponent is Thomas Huxley.

Commonsense psychological concepts are illusory and should be replaced by neuroscientific terms. Proponents include Paul and Patricia Churchland.

The fundamental nature of reality is neither mental nor physical, but a neutral substance. Proponents include Baruch Spinoza and Ernst Mach.

Perceptions or consciousness directly grasp the external world without any intermediate representation. Proponents include G.E. Moore and John McDowell.

The hallmark of the mental is 'aboutness' or 'directedness' towards an object. Proponent is Franz Brentano.

Physical entities have both physical and mental properties. Proponent is David Chalmers.

Mental events are physical events, but mental properties are not reducible to physical properties. Proponent is Donald Davidson.

Mental states are representational states. Proponent is Fred Dretske.

Mental states are just descriptions of behavior. Proponents include B.F. Skinner.

Belief in the existence of both mental and physical properties. Proponents include René Descartes.

Mental states are defined by what they do rather than by what they are made of. Proponents include Hilary Putnam.

Basic physical entities possess proto-mental properties. Proponent is William James.

We perceive the external world indirectly through internal representations. Proponents include John Locke.

The mind is a non-reducible aspect of the physical; this includes the emergence theory. Proponent is John Searle.

All facts are ultimately physical facts. Proponents include Jaegwon Kim.

All matter has a mental aspect or consciousness. Proponents include Galen Strawson.

Mental states are identical to physical brain states. Proponents include J.J.C. Smart and U.T. Place.