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This concept, highlighted by Duhem and Quine, suggests that empirical data can be explained by multiple theories; thus, empirical data alone cannot determine which theory is true.

Scientific realism is the view that the universe described by science is real regardless of how it is observed. Notable proponents include Hilary Putnam and Richard Boyd.

Logical positivism, associated with the Vienna Circle, maintains that only statements verifiable through empirical observation or logical proof are meaningful. Critics include Karl Popper and W.V.O. Quine.

Hans Reichenbach distinguished between the context of discovery (how scientific ideas are conceived) and the context of justification (how those ideas are scientifically verified).

Rationalism argues that reason rather than experience is the primary source of knowledge. Notable rationalists include Rene Descartes and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.

The Duhem-Quine thesis asserts that because hypotheses cannot be tested in isolation (due to interference of background assumptions), it is impossible to test a single scientific hypothesis on its own.

Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend suggest that some scientific theories are incommensurable, meaning it's impossible to understand one theory in the terms of another due to differing standards and terminology.

Empiricism emphasizes that knowledge comes primarily from sensory experience. Proponents include John Locke and David Hume, while critics like Immanuel Kant argued for innate knowledge.

Introduced by Thomas Kuhn in 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions', paradigm shifts occur when a dominant scientific framework is replaced due to anomalies and new theories emerge.

Constructivism posits that scientific knowledge is a social construction, influenced by social context and human interest. Proponents include Bruno Latour and Harry Collins.

Anti-realism in science challenges the idea that scientific theories truthfully represent reality, suggesting instead that such theories are successful constructs that fit observations.

Introduced by Imre Lakatos, research programmes are series of theories in a sequence that are characterized by a shared 'hard core' of beliefs and a protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses.

The pessimistic induction argument, outlined by philosophers like Larry Laudan, suggests that because many scientific theories have been discarded in the past, current theories are likely to be discarded in the future.

Proposed by Karl Popper, falsifiability is a criterion for demarcating science from non-science. A theory is scientific if it can be refuted by possible observations.

Instrumentalism, supported by John Dewey, holds that scientific theories are merely tools for predicting phenomena, not necessarily true descriptions of reality.

Bayesian epistemology uses Bayesian probability to update the credibility of hypotheses based on new evidence. Key proponents include Pierre-Simon Laplace and Thomas Bayes.

Scientific progress refers to the cumulative growth of knowledge in science. While Kuhn suggested progress is not linear, others argue for a more conventional incremental accumulation of knowledge.

Confirmation holism, closely related to the Duhem-Quine thesis, suggests that scientific evidence cannot support or refute individual hypotheses in isolation but rather the entire theoretical framework.

Pragmatism in science, as advocated by Charles Sanders Peirce and William James, suggests that theories should be judged by their practical applications and usefulness, rather than by their correspondence to reality.