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Subjective experiences that cannot be directly measured or communicated.

The belief that mind and body are fundamentally different kinds of things.

The theory that everything that exists is no more extensive than its physical properties.

The view that consciousness is a fundamental and widespread property of the world.

The theory that mental phenomena are causal outcomes of physical processes but have no causal influence themselves.

The perspective that mind and body are two aspects of the same substance, which is itself neither mental nor physical.

The metaphysical view that the mind or spirit constitutes the fundamental reality.

The position that there are mental properties that are not reducible to physical properties.

The belief in the existence of two kinds of substance: mental and material.

The theory that the mind and body interact causally with each other.

The belief that consciousness arises from the right organization of physical processes, but isn't reducible to them.

The view that mental states are constituted by their functional role in the computational or input-output profile of a system.

The belief that divinity or consciousness is identical with or pervades everything.

The idea that a single mental state could be instantiated by many different physical states.

The speculation that quantum mechanical phenomena, like entanglement and superposition, may play a part in cognitive processes.

The philosophical concept that consciousness is about or of something.

The view that the hard problem of consciousness may never be solved by human minds.

The aspect of consciousness dealing with the experiential or 'what it is like' component.

The aspect of consciousness that relates to the availability of information to various cognitive processes.

The position that while mental states are physical they cannot be reduced to physical properties.

The belief that mental states are directly identifiable with physical brain states.

A claim that individual instances of mental states can be identified with individual physical states.

The notion that common-sense psychological concepts of belief and desire are false and should be replaced by a more robust neurological framework.

The relationship between two sets of properties such that when one set of properties changes, there must be a corresponding change in the other set.