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Emergentism holds that complex systems give rise to emergent properties not reducible to their components. This perspective impacts metaphysical debates about the relationship between consciousness and the physical world.

Physicalism is the theory that the only thing that exists is matter, and that all phenomena, including mental phenomena, can be explained by physical processes. This has implications for understanding consciousness and challenges dualistic views of the mind.

Intentionality is the capacity of the mind to be about, to represent, or to stand for things, properties, or states of affairs. Exploring intentionality helps address metaphysical inquiries on how thoughts can correspond to or represent reality.

Panprotopsychism is the view that proto-consciousness is a basic feature of reality and that complex consciousness arises from it. This theory deals with metaphysical questions about the origins and ubiquity of consciousness in the cosmos.

Mental Causation is the concept that mental events can cause physical events, and vice versa. In metaphysics, it involves examining the nature of causation and how mental and physical states interact within a causally closed physical world.

Introspection is the examination of one's own conscious thoughts and feelings. Metaphysically, it raises questions about the reliability of self-knowledge and implications for understanding the mind from a first-person perspective.

Property dualism asserts that there are both physical and non-physical properties of the world. It suggests that while mental states are physical, mental properties are non-physical, affecting discussions on the nature of existence and the relationship between mind and body.

Personal Identity deals with what it means to be the same person over time. Metaphysically, this concerns the nature of self, the persistence of identity through change, and the implications for consciousness and memory.

The Zombie Argument suggests that it is conceivable there could be beings physically identical to us, without any consciousness (philosophical zombies). This posits a metaphysical question about the physical sufficiency for consciousness and the nature of qualia.

Phenomenal Consciousness refers to the subjective, qualitative aspects of conscious experience. This concept is central in metaphysical debates over the nature of consciousness and explaining 'what it's like' to experience something.

The Identity Theory claims that mental states are identical to physical brain states. Metaphysically, it addresses the unity of the mind with the body, but faces challenges explaining the subjective quality of experiences (qualia).

Multiple Realizability is the idea that a mental state can be manifested in various physical systems, not just the human brain. This has ramifications for metaphysical views on the nature of mental states and their dependence on physical substrates.

Eliminative Materialism posits that common-sense understanding of the mind is mistaken and certain mental states believed to exist do not. It is significant in metaphysics as it challenges the existence of certain mental entities and properties.

Solipsism is the philosophical idea that only one's mind is sure to exist and knowledge of anything outside of it is unsure. In metaphysics, it is a radical perspective on the nature of reality and our understanding of external objects.

Neutral Monism posits that the mental and the physical are two aspects of some underlying, neutral substance. It plays a part in metaphysical discussions about the fundamental substance of the universe and the mind-body problem.

Supervenience refers to a relationship where the instantiation of one set of properties (mental) depends on another set of properties (physical), such that there cannot be a change in the mental without a change in the physical. It is crucial for understanding metaphysical relations between mind and body.

Idealism posits that reality is fundamentally mental; material objects exist only as aspects of the mind's perception. In metaphysics, it raises questions about the existence of a material world beyond mental experiences.

Panpsychism is the view that consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical world. It addresses metaphysical questions about the distribution of consciousness and challenges our understanding of the nature of matter and mind.

Anomalous Monism suggests that mental states are identical with physical states, but there are no strict laws linking the mental to the physical due to the 'anomalous' nature of mental events. This relates to metaphysical debates on lawfulness and causality in mental-physical correlations.

Qualia are the subjective, first-person experiences associated with mental states. The study of qualia leads to metaphysical discussions about the nature of consciousness and the possibility of an explanatory gap in understanding subjective experience.

Dualism is the view that the mind and body are fundamentally different kinds of substances. This relates to metaphysical questions concerning the nature of reality and what it means to be human. It challenges the idea that the mind can be reduced to purely physical processes.

Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain but have no effects upon any physical events. It raises questions about the causal role of the mental in a world that appears to be physically closed.

The Hard Problem of Consciousness asks why and how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experience. It challenges metaphysical understandings of consciousness and the explanatory gap in materialistic accounts of the mind.