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Changes in context can raise or lower the standards for what counts as a justified belief, affecting when we attribute knowledge.

Shows how practical stakes in different contexts can alter whether someone is said to know something.

Contextualism disputes invariantist claims by arguing that the truth conditions of knowledge attributions can change with context.

Asserts that what is salient in the conversational context can influence the epistemic standards applied.

Contextualism addresses skeptical arguments by suggesting that they involve unusually high epistemic standards, not typically relevant in everyday contexts.

Contextualism allows for resolving the paradox by claiming that the standards for knowledge attribution are different in everyday and lottery contexts.

This theory complements contextualism by suggesting that only relevant alternatives need to be eliminated to attribute knowledge, which changes with context.

Contrastivism refines contextualism by positing that knowledge is always knowledge of one proposition rather than another, based on context.

Contextualism can provide a nuanced approach to the closure principle, suggesting its application may differ across contexts.