Discover published sets by community

This critique argues that reliabilism can lead to counterintuitive outcomes, such as attributing justification to beliefs formed by processes like clairvoyance, which we wouldn't normally consider reliable or justifiable.

This viewpoint emphasizes the trustworthiness of the agent’s intellectual faculties or character in the justification of beliefs.

A thought experiment that raises the issue that if a subject’s beliefs are formed under an evil demon’s deception, reliabilism implies these beliefs are unjustified though they're intuitively justified.

Reliabilism proposes a justification for true belief that doesn’t solely rely on evidence known by the subject, challenging traditional evidentialist accounts of knowledge.

A principle that acknowledges different cognitive processes can reliably lead to the same true belief, suggesting flexibility and adaptability in the mechanisms justifying belief.

A critique that reliabilism may lead to overgeneralizing processes that occasionally yield true beliefs, subsequently classifying them as reliable.

Highlights that reliabilism is a form of externalism since it posits that factors outside the believer’s subjective perspective contribute to the epistemic justification of beliefs.

Simple reliabilism focuses only on the reliability of the process, while proper function reliabilism adds that the cognitive faculties must be functioning properly and be aimed at truth.

A major critique pointing out that the reliability of a belief-forming process depends on how broadly or narrowly the process is characterized, which can lead to ambiguity.

An objection to reliabilism based on the thought experiment where a Swampman is randomly formed with identical mental states to a person, questioning if its beliefs can be considered justified.

Suggests that reliabilism must account for inferential beliefs, which are justified through a chain of reasoning from other beliefs, and the individual reliability of each step is crucial.