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As an externalist view, reliabilism suggests that beliefs are justified if they are produced by a process that reliably leads to the truth, regardless of any internal access to the justification.

Defeasibility theory suggests that a belief is justified until an overriding or 'defeating' belief is introduced, and can be seen as an internalist position if the defeating conditions are required to be internally recognizable.

Evidentialism asserts that one's beliefs must be proportioned to the evidence. This is an internalist position as it implies the necessary evidence must be internally accessible to the believer for proper justification.

According to externalism, a belief has warrant (i.e., it is knowledge-producing) if it is formed in an epistemically conducive environment, regardless of the believer's awareness of this environment.

Access internalism insists that justification for a belief requires that a person must have reflective access to the justifiers of their beliefs, internally aligning with the idea that reasons must be mentally available.

Infinitism is the idea that justification consists of an infinite chain of reasons. This aligns more closely with internalism, as it implies an endless internal scrutiny of reasons for belief.

Virtue epistemology may align with externalism, suggesting that knowledge is a result of intellectual virtue – a trait which may not be consciously accessible or internally justified by the individual.

Foundationalism considers certain basic beliefs to be self-justified without the need for further evidence. It can align with internalism if these basic beliefs are seen as internally self-evident.

Mentalism contends that the justificatory status of a belief is determined by the individual's mental states, irrespective of external realities, firmly planting it in the internalist camp.

Coherentism posits that beliefs are justified by their coherence with a system of beliefs. As an internalist theory, it requires that the system of beliefs be internally coherent and consistent.

Traditionally, knowledge has been characterized by the JTB account, which aligns with internalism since it requires the justification of beliefs to be accessible to the believer's consciousness.

Alvin Plantinga's proper functionalism claims that beliefs are warranted if they function properly according to a design plan, which aligns with externalism as it does not require internal knowledge of this plan.

Content externalism argues that the content of one's mental states depends on external factors, which reflects an externalist point of view since the environment influences the beliefs without internal awareness.

Skepticism challenges both internalist and externalist conceptions of justification by questioning whether we have any justified beliefs at all, but it often aligns with internalism in its emphasis on accessible reasons.