Discover published sets by community

Dualism posits that the mind and body are two distinct substances, but it struggles to coherently explain how these two substances with different properties can interact causally. Critics argue that there's no plausible mechanism for non-physical mind to effect physical changes in the brain.

Dualism is often criticized for the lack of empirical evidence that supports the existence of non-physical substances. The scientific method relies on observable and testable phenomena, which the non-physical mind proposed by dualists is not.

From an evolutionary perspective, dualism is criticised because it fails to explain how mental phenomena could evolve alongside physical traits, given that the mind is considered a non-physical substance.

Critics argue dualism cannot adequately explain how non-physical minds are individuated and identified. Unlike physical objects, which can be individuated by location and composition, it's not clear how non-physical minds are distinct from one another.

Contemporary neuroscience increasingly shows that cognitive processes and experiences can be correlated with brain states and functions. This challenges dualism by providing evidence that mental states may not require a non-physical substance to exist.

Ockham's Razor suggests that simpler theories are preferable to more complex ones when explaining phenomena. Dualism, by introducing a non-physical substance in addition to the physical, is often seen as unnecessarily complex compared to physicalist viewpoints.

If the mind is non-physical, it's difficult to understand how mental states could have any causal power over physical states without resorting to an implausible form of interactionism that contradicts physical laws.