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A philosophical zombie is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience. When a p-zombie behaves as if it is in pain, for example, there is no 'inner' experience of pain; it is a simulation without any subjective consciousness.

The hard problem of consciousness refers to the question of how and why we have qualia or subjective experiences. The notion of p-zombies is used to argue that physicalist explanations of consciousness are insufficient because they could not explain why p-zombies cannot exist if consciousness is merely a product of physical processes.

P-zombies raise questions about the nature of consciousness and the possibility of its detection or measurement from an external perspective. They challenge our understanding of what makes an entity 'conscious' and whether consciousness can be considered an intrinsic property of certain physical systems.

The knowledge argument suggests that there are truths about consciousness that cannot be captured by physicalist knowledge. Even if someone knew all the physical facts about another conscious being, the subjective experience would not be accessible. P-zombies exemplify this by being physically identical to humans but lacking consciousness.

The logical possibility of p-zombies suggests that consciousness is not necessarily entailed by physical processes. This provides a challenge to physicalism because if it were true, then it seems that p-zombies should not be conceivable. Their logical possibility implies there may be more to understanding consciousness than just understanding brain states and functions.