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Mental representations are internal, symbolic constructs within the mind that stand in for and allow individuals to think about objects, events, and concepts from the external world.

RTM is the idea that mental states are representations of the world and that mental processes operate on these representations in a way akin to a language of thought.

Fodor asserts that mental states are computational states, and he introduced the notion of a 'language of thought' in which ideas are encoded in mental representations that have a syntactic and semantic structure.

Searle is known for his theory of 'Intentional States', where he posits that intentionality involves mental states that are both representational and have a subjective aspect called 'qualia'.

This debate in the philosophy of mind concerns whether mental states are determined internally by an individual’s psychological state only (internalism) or whether they also depend on factors external to the mind, such as social and environmental contexts (externalism).

In philosophy of mind, intentionality refers to the property of mental states that are about, of, or directed toward something else, implying that they have content or representational character.

Qualia refer to the subjective, qualitative aspects of conscious experience. In the context of intentionality, theorists discuss whether mental representations must include qualia to fully capture the nature of mind and consciousness.

Husserl’s phenomenology explores intentionality as the structure of consciousness whereby consciousness is always 'of' something, and this relation is a direct, pre-linguistic experience.

Dennett's 'intentional stance' theory posits that treating the behavior of an entity as if it is governed by appropriate mental states (beliefs and desires) is often an effective strategy to predict and explain behavior.