Discover published sets by community

Within epiphenomenalism, mental states are acknowledged but are deemed ineffective in causing physical events. Proponents argue that this avoids the mystical aspects of dualism. Against it, the problem of mental causation persists: if mental events are indeed caused by physical events, it is difficult to understand the seeming irreducibility and privacy of subjective experiences.

Epiphenomenalism posits that mental phenomena are epiphenomena, or secondary phenomena, that do not influence our bodies or other mental states. This theory preserves a scientific worldview by postulating that only physical substances have causal powers. Detractors argue that epiphenomenalism fails to account for our lived experience, where our intentions and thoughts seem to cause actions.

Epiphenomenalism is a theory suggesting that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events. Reasons for it include simplicity and consistency with physicalism. Arguments against it often involve the intuition that mental states do influence our actions and the lack of empirical evidence for a one-way interaction.

In epiphenomenalism, subjective experiences, or qualia, are not seen as causally potent. The position is favored for avoiding dualism while acknowledging consciousness. However, it faces the issue of explaining why we have the illusion of conscious causation if consciousness is indeed causally ineffective.

Epiphenomenalism asserts that physical events can cause mental events, but mental events are causally inert. Reasons for this theory include the law of conservation of energy, which implies that non-physical entities cannot affect physical ones. However, critics argue that this view is counterintuitive as it discounts the role of consciousness in decision-making.