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States that every mental state is identical to a physical state. U.T. Place and J.J.C. Smart are key theorists.

Suggests mental states are constituted by their causal relations to one another and to sensory inputs and behavioral outputs. Hilary Putnam is a notable proponent.

Posits that consciousness is a fundamental feature of physical entities. Galen Strawson and David Chalmers have advocated for this view.

Proposes that the mind and body are distinct and separable. René Descartes is the key figure behind Cartesian Dualism.

Argues that some or all of the mental states posited by common sense do not actually exist. Supported by Paul and Patricia Churchland.

Posits that the mental and the physical are two ways of organizing the same elements, which are themselves 'neutral'. Bertrand Russell and Baruch Spinoza have contributed to this theory.

Claims that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events. Thomas Huxley is a notable proponent.

Holds that the qualitative aspects of our experiences can be fully explained in terms of their representational properties. Proponents include Fred Dretske and Michael Tye.

Refers to the 'what it is like' aspect of consciousness, the subjective quality of experiences. Frank Jackson's 'knowledge argument' discusses qualia.

Defines mental states in terms of behavior and behavioral dispositions. B.F. Skinner is a main proponent of this view.

Acknowledges that there are non-physical properties (such as mental states) that are not reducible to physical properties. David Chalmers supports this theory.