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Substance Dualism posits that mind and body are fundamentally different substances, with the mind being non-physical. René Descartes is the main proponent, arguing for a clear distinction between the mind (res cogitans) and the body (res extensa).

Parallelism, notably proposed by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, suggests that the mind and body do not interact but their relationship is pre-established by God in harmony. Hence, mental and physical events only appear to influence one another.

Interactionism is the belief that the mind and body interact causally. René Descartes supported this view by suggesting the pineal gland as the site of interaction between the non-physical mind and the physical body.

Occasionalism, advanced by Nicolas Malebranche, posits that there are no causal relations between material and immaterial substances. Instead, God intervenes on each occasion to align the events in the mind with those in the physical world.

This argument posits that mental states cannot be reduced to physical states. It supports dualism by claiming that consciousness and subjective experiences (qualia) cannot be fully explained by physical processes alone.

Double-Aspect Theory purports that the mental and the physical are two aspects of the same substance. Spinoza is one of its proponents, suggesting that mind and body are one and the same thing, expressed in two different ways.

Property Dualism argues that while there may be only one kind of substance, such as physical matter, this substance possesses two distinct sets of properties: physical and mental. David Chalmers is a notable proponent, discussing concepts like 'conscious experience' or 'qualia'.